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The French Twitter case shows the difficulties experienced by courts, national authorities and 
companies, in relation to an international activity, and to find an equilibrium between 
freedom of expression and its limits, notably in the respect of public order. Moreover, it also 
shows that in a significant number of cases on the Internet, the application of the French law 
depends on the goodwill of the companies or the authorities of a foreign state. 
In the autumn of 2012, there was a wave of tweets on Twitter in French with racist content 
using the hashtags2 #unbonjuif [a good Jew] or #unjuifmort [a dead Jew]. The tweets were 
contrary to the French public order. 
                                               
1 This commentary is based on a previous blog post of the SURVEILLE FP7 project (http://www.surveille.eu). 
I thank Stephen Mason for his useful comments; of course, all errors are that of the author. 
2 In French, the decision was made to translate ‘hashtag’ by ‘mot-dièse’; see: ‘Vocabulaire des 
télécommunications et de l’informatique (NOR: CTNX1242797K)’, Journal Officiel de la République française, 19, 
23 January 2013, 1515 
Page 2 of 9 
On the 23 October 2012, a number of French associations acting against racism requested 
Twitter to remove the tweets. The associations based their action on the provisions of article 
6.I.7 of the act of 21 June 2004 on confidence in the digital economy (LCEN).3 Indeed, 
according to article 6.I.2 of LCEN, providers are not civilly liable for the content they host if 
they are not aware of the wrongfulness of this content; moreover, article 6.I.7, used by the 
associations, specifies that there is not a general obligation on the provider to monitor the 
content it hosts, but it has a duty as follows: 
‘[…] Compte tenu de l’intérêt général attaché à la répression de l’apologie des crimes 
contre l’humanité, de l’incitation à la haine raciale ainsi que de la pornographie 
enfantine […] elles doivent mettre en place un dispositif facilement accessible et 
visible permettant à toute personne de porter à leur connaissance ce type de données. 
Elles ont également l’obligation, d'une part, d’informer promptement les autorités 
publiques compétentes de toutes activités illicites mentionnées à l’alinéa précédent qui 
leur seraient signalées et qu’exerceraient les destinataires de leurs services, et, d’autre 
part, de rendre publics les moyens qu’elles consacrent à la lutte contre ces activités 
illicites.’ 
‘[…] Given the general interest attached to the repression of the apology of crimes 
against humanity, incitement to racial hatred and child pornography […] they must 
establish an easily accessible and visible device for anyone to draw their attention to 
this type of data. They also have an obligation, on the one hand, to promptly inform 
the competent public authorities of all illegal activities mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph which are reported to them and performed by the users of their services, and, 
on the other hand to render public how they spend the fight against these illegal 
activities.’ 
By their letter, the associations rendered Twitter aware of the wrongfulness of the tweets, and 
so Twitter had to take action against them; if not, Twitter would be liable for the content of 
the tweets. The associations decided to seize the court of the matter due to the lack of an 
answer and any action from Twitter, although Twitter eventually made the tweets inaccessible. 
                                                                                                                                                   
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=31D2C7AB2F1C537B51631A55E96447C3.tpdjo09v_
3?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000026972451&dateTexte=&oldAction=rechJO&categorieLien=id. 
3 Loi n° 2004-575 du 21 juin 2004 loi pour la confiance dans l’économie numérique. 
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The first instance procedure  
On 29 November 2012, two French associations, the Union des Etudiants Juifs de France 
(UEJF) [French Jewish Students Union] and the Association J’accuse – action internationale 
pour la justice, decided to take legal action against Twitter in France.4 In addition, their 
action was accompanied by voluntary interventions from three others associations, Le 
Mouvement Contre Le Racisme et pour L’Amitié Entre Les Peuples (MRAP), La ligue 
contre le racisme et l’antisémitisme (LICRA) and Association SOS Racisme-Touche pas a 
mon pote. On 20 December 2012, the same associations took another legal action, for the 
same reasons, against the newly created French subsidiary of Twitter, Twitter France.5 The 
judge decided to join both cases, and so they will be considered together. 
Before going further, it is important to note that in France, article 48-1 of the law of 29 of 
July 1881 on the freedom of the press,6 as noted in the case, states that French associations 
may exercise rights for different kind of offence: 
‘combattre le racisme ou d’assister les victimes de discrimination fondée sur leur 
origine nationale, ethnique, raciale ou religieuse, peut exercer les droits reconnus à la 
partie civile’ 
‘combating racism and assisting victims of discrimination based on racial or religious, 
national, ethnic origin, may exercise the rights granted to the civil party’ 
This explains why, in this case, some associations took legal action against Twitter. Moreover, 
it should be added that Twitter did not contest the competence of the plaintiff associations. 
The associations asked primarily for two things: firstly, ‘to order the company Twitter Inc. to 
provide them with the data listed in the decree 2011-219 of 25 February 2011 likely to enable 
the identification of any person who has contributed to the creation of clearly illegal tweets 
[…]’ and secondly, ‘to order the company Twitter Inc. to implement in the context of the 
French platform service Twitter Inc. a device easily accessible and visible to any person to 
                                               
4 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Ordonnance de référé, 24 janv. 2013, n° 13/50262, n° 13/50276, UEJF 
et a. c/ Twitter Inc. et Sté Twitter France. 
5 The company Twitter France was created on the 19 November 2012 and is incorporated in France (789305596 
R.C.S. PARIS); see https://www.infogreffe.fr/societes/entreprise-societe/789305596-twitter-france-sas-
750112B228780000.html. 
6 Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse. 
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bring to the knowledge of illegal content falling within the scope of defending crimes against 
humanity and incitement to racial hatred’. 
The judge agreed with the demands of the plaintiffs and ordered ‘the company Twitter Inc. to 
communicate with the five associations because the data in its possession is likely to enable 
the identification of any person who has contributed to the creation of clearly illegal tweets 
with URLs that include the device assignment of 29 November in 2012, made inaccessible on 
notification of 23 October 2012’; moreover, the judge added ‘that communication must take 
place within fifteen days of service of this decision, and under penalty of €1,000 per day of 
delay after such period’. Secondly, the judge ordered ‘the company Twitter Inc. to implement 
in the context of the French service platform Twitter Inc. a device that is easily accessible and 
visible to any person to bring knowledge of illegal content, including falling within the scope 
of the apology of crimes against humanity and incitement to racial hatred’. 
To come to this decision, the first question for the judge was to determine if she was 
competent; and following it, the main questions were to qualify Twitter Inc. and Twitter 
France, their connexion with France and its territory, and the applicable law. 
On the competence of the French judge, the litigious tweets had been received in France, 
because Twitter can be viewed everywhere in the world. Consequently, damage occurred on 
the French territory and so the French judge was competent.7 In addition, it should be noted 
that it is specified in the case that Twitter did not dispute the jurisdiction of the French judge 
or the illegality of the tweets. The French judge was competent to deal with this case. 
The judge examined the two demands separately. Firstly, the judge investigated the demand 
from the associations that Twitter should enable the identification of the authors of the tweets 
by transmitting the identification data it possessed. 
According to the associations, Twitter and its French branch, Twitter France, should be seen 
as a provider with a sufficient connexion with France, notably due to the existence of Twitter 
France, making the French law applicable. The defendant argued that Twitter France was 
created only for a commercial purpose, notably marketing, and all the data are collected and 
stored only by Twitter in the United States, and so it cannot be seen as a provider under the 
French law, which meant that the French law was inapplicable. 
                                               
7 Emmanuel Derieux, ‘Diffusion de messages racistes sur Twitter: Obligations de l’hébergeur’, Revue Lamy droit 
de l’immatériel, 90 (February 2013), 27-32, 28. 
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To answer this demand, the judge started by deciding if the act of 21 June 2004 on 
confidence in the digital economy (LCEN) and its qualification of provider were applicable to 
Twitter and to the case. LCEN does not specify its spatial applicability, but the provision of 
article 4 of its Implementing Decree No. 2011-219 of 25 February 20118 provides that 
‘La conservation des données mentionnées à l’article 1er est soumise aux prescriptions 
de la loi du 6 janvier 1978 susvisée, notamment les prescriptions prévues à l’article 34, 
relatives à la sécurité des informations.’ 
‘The retention of data referred to in article 1 shall be subject to the requirements of the 
law of 6 January 1978 referred to above, including the requirements set out in article 
34, for information security.’ 
Article 2 of Law No. 78-12 of 6 January 19789 relating to computers, files and freedoms 
accurate treatment are subject to this law ‘whose controller is established on the French 
territory’ or ‘uses processing means located on French territory.’ The judge followed the 
arguments of the defendant about the commercial purpose of Twitter France and that Twitter 
is incorporated in the United States and does not use the French territory for its activity; 
consequently, the judge declared LCEN inapplicable to the case. 
Some authors find the way that the judge solved the conflict of laws not fully convincing.10 
Moreover, the plaintiffs argued that some articles of LCEN can be qualified as statutes 
relating to public policy and safety that would apply to a foreign company such as Twitter, 
and so it would have avoided the necessity to resolve the conflict of laws. It should be noted 
here that the notion of statutes relating to public policy and safety is controversial. However, 
as it was a procedure for interim relief, the judge did not go further on this question. 
Finally, the judge found the solution in the alternative demand of the plaintiffs on the basis of 
article 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure,11 which reads: 
‘S’il existe un motif légitime de conserver ou d’établir avant tout procès la preuve de 
faits dont pourrait dépendre la solution d’un litige, les mesures d’instruction 
                                               
8 Décret n° 2011-219 du 25 février 2011 relatif à la conservation et à la communication des données permettant 
d’identifier toute personne ayant contribué à la création d’un contenu mis en ligne. 
9 Loi n° 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés. 
10 Anne Cousin, ‘Twitter peut-elle échapper à la loi française ?’, Recueil Dalloz (2013), 696. 
11 Code de procédure civile. 
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légalement admissibles peuvent être ordonnées à la demande de tout intéressé, sur 
requête ou en référé.’ 
‘If there is a legitimate reason to preserve or to establish, before any legal process, the 
evidence of the facts upon which the resolution of the dispute depends, legally 
permissible preparatory inquiries may be ordered at the request of any interested party, 
by way of a petition or by way of a summary procedure.’ 
The present action was a procedure for interim relief. The judge justified the application of 
this article with three arguments: firstly, the litigious tweets are offences under French law 
and only Twitter could identify the persons concerned in order to initiate legal proceedings 
against the authors; secondly, Twitter did not contest the wrongful character of the litigious 
tweets; and thirdly, Twitter possessed the data due to its obligation to conserve them under 
Californian law. However, here the application depended on the cooperation of Twitter. If 
Twitter is not cooperative, the French judge would have to request the execution from a 
Californian judge, and the success of such demand is not certain. 
The second demand investigated by the judge was for the creation of a method to identify and 
inform Twitter about manifestly illegal content. The main argument by the associations was 
the fact that ‘the form in question was not available in the French language in any case on the 
eve of the hearing’, however Twitter produced a form on the day of the hearing. The judge 
followed the plaintiffs, and recognised that the form produced by Twitter was not sufficiently 
visible and accessible. However, as Twitter agreed on the necessity of such form, the judge did 
not go further and just asked Twitter to make the form more visible. Here again, the 
implementation of the decision depended on the cooperation of Twitter. 
The appeal by Twitter  
On 21 March 2013, Twitter decided to appeal the first instance decision.12 From the first 
instance decision, Twitter had to comply with two obligations, firstly, to communicate data 
that would enable the identification of the authors of the illegal tweets; and secondly, to 
establish a method to identify and inform Twitter about manifestly illegal content. 
Regarding the obligation to communicate data that would enable the identification of the 
authors of illegal tweets, Twitter recognized that it possessed the data, but refused to 
                                               
12 Cour d’Appel de Paris, 12 June 2013, Twitter Inc. et Twitter France c/ UEJF et a. 
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communicate it for two reasons: firstly, Twitter justified its decision not to transmit the data 
by the fact that it would be an irreversible act without a possible appeal for the users 
concerned. Secondly, Twitter restated, as it did in the first instance hearing, that it is 
committed to provide the data for the identification of the authors of tweets exclusively in 
connection with an international rogatory commission respecting the provisions of 
international conventions ratified by France and the United States. For the judge of appeal, 
this was not sufficient to justify the refusal of Twitter to communicate the data, because 
Twitter failed to comply with the decision that it had appealed against (article 526 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure), which meant it could not appeal on a point that it failed to comply 
with. 
Regarding the second obligation, the day after the first instance judgment, Twitter had 
implemented a method to identify and inform Twitter about manifestly illegal content in 
French. However, l’UEJF, as well as the judge of appeal, considered that this new procedure 
was not visible enough for users. The process of identifying illegal content is described in the 
judgment; the main criticism from both the UEJF and the judge was the fact that signalling 
illegal content was not possible from the main page, and the user had to pass through the help 
centre of Twitter and obtain access to more pages before signalling the illegal content. 
As a consequence, the judge of appeal concluded that Twitter had not complied with the two 
obligations arising from the first instance decision, and the judge of appeal decided to strike 
out the appeal formed by Twitter. To do so, the French judge used the provisions of article 
526 of the French Code of Civil Procedure, which allows the judge to strike out the appeal 
when the appellant does not justify the reason of his failure to execute the appealed decision. 
Developments related to and following the trial  
Since the beginning of this case, in addition to its legal side, there was a significant political 
side. Fleur Pellerin, the French Minister for the Digital Economy, declared that Twitter must 
conform to the European legal system and human rights.13 Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, the 
French Minister of Women’s Rights and Government spokesperson, published an opinion 
column in the French newspaper Le Monde where she asked Twitter to find a way to control 
users’ publications with racist or homophobic content, and warned Twitter against future 
                                               
13 Eric Pfanner and David Jolly, ‘Pushing France Onto the Digital Stage’, The New York Times, 16 January 2013, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/17/technology/17iht-pellerin17.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. 
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possible legal action in France or in Europe.14 The French government organised a meeting 
with Twitter and the associations that respond to racism and homophobia.15 Following this 
meeting, on 17 May 2013, Najat Vallaud-Belkacem announced on her Twitter account that 
the association SOS Homophobie had been granted a specific Twitter account, allowing it to 
signal illegal tweets.16 Some noted that Twitter seems to have been much more receptive and 
cooperative than other internet companies in previous cases, even if some other internet 
companies found a solution with the French associations without going to court.17 Finally, the 
on 12 July 2013, Twitter announced that it would cooperate with the French court and 
provide the required identification data.18 
However, the anonymity and impunity of the users of Twitter for the content of their tweets 
was not only criticised in France but also in several other countries. Notably in the United 
Kingdom, where some women in the public eye received bomb threats and rape threats on 
their Twitter accounts.19 In the following days, a debate occurred in the UK, and more than 
127,000 people signed a petition calling Twitter to add a ‘report abuse’ button.20 Finally, on 3 
August 2013, Twitter announced on its UK blog (http://blog.uk.twitter.com) of a number 
changes, notably the introduction of an ‘in-Tweet report button’; this ‘in-Tweet report button’ 
                                               
14 Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, ‘Twitter doit respecter les valeurs de la République’, Le Monde, 28 December 2012, 
available at http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2012/12/28/twitter-doit-respecter-les-valeurs-de-la-
republique_1811161_3232.html. 
15 LeMonde.fr, ‘La justice française ordonne à Twitter d’aider à identifier les auteurs de tweets litigieux’, 
LeMonde.fr, 24 January 2013, available at http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/01/24/la-justice-
francaise-ordonne-a-twitter-d-aider-a-identifier-les-auteurs-de-tweets-litigieux_1822165_651865.html. 
16 The announcement of Najat Vallaud-Belkacem (@najatvb) was done in two tweets posted on the 17 May 
2013: https://twitter.com/najatvb/status/335402195711320064 and 
https://twitter.com/najatvb/status/335402423399100416; see also Cedric Manara, ‘Twitter: validité du dispositif 
de signalement de contenus illicites’, Dalloz actualité (2013), 1614. 
17 Anne Cousin, ‘Twitter peut-elle échapper à la loi française ?’; France24, ‘Twitter accepte de livrer des données 
à la justice française’, France 24, 12 July 2013, available at http://www.france24.com/fr/20130712-tweets-
racistes-twitter-accepte-livrer-noms-donnees-a-justice-francaise/. 
18 France 24, ‘Twitter accepte de livrer des données à la justice française’, France 24, 12 July 2013, available at 
http://www.france24.com/fr/20130712-tweets-racistes-twitter-accepte-livrer-noms-donnees-a-justice-francaise; 
Znet.fr, ‘Tweets antisémites: Twitter accepte de transmettre ses données à la justice’, Znet.fr, 12 July 2013, 
available at http://www.zdnet.fr/actualites/tweets-antisemites-twitter-accepte-de-transmettre-ses-donnees-a-la-
justice-39792385.htm. 
19 ‘Twitter’s Tony Wang issues apology to abuse victims’, BBC News UK, 3 August 2013, available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23559605. 
20 The petition is accessible by following this link: http://www.change.org/en-GB/petitions/twitter-add-a-
report-abuse-button-to-tweets. 
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is already available for IOS and ‘[s]tarting next month, this button will also be available in our 
Android app and on Twitter.com.’21 
Conclusion  
The creation of the ‘in-Tweet report button’ was one of the demands of the French 
associations in the Twitter case. It can be assumed that, in addition to what happened in the 
UK, the French litigation had probably also contributed to raising awareness with Twitter on 
the necessity of including such a button. 
As a result, Twitter has now complied with the two obligations arising from the French 
Twitter case. 
As will be observed, all the outcome of the case depended on the willingness of Twitter to 
comply; indeed, the compliance of Twitter was not the result of a judicial decision, but of 
pressure of public opinion. Consequently, the application of the French law appears to 
depend on the goodwill of the foreign provider, or in case of a legal procedure, on the 
goodwill of the authorities of the host country of the company. Moreover, it should be noted 
that the French decision concern only two hashtags: #Unbonjuif and #unjuifmort, two others 
were not determined by the judge in the case,22 and so the abusive comments relating to other 
hashtags and their contents was left to the goodwill of Twitter. In case of disagreement with 
Twitter, a new trial would be necessary. 
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21 The blog post is accessible by following this link: http://blog.uk.twitter.com/2013/08/our-commitment.html. 
22 The two hashtags were #simonfilsestgay [if my son is gay] and #simafilleramèneunnoir [if my daughter brings a 
black man]. 
